

Wizard Devices, Inc.
1731 Crestview Drive
Rockville, Md. 20854

December 20, 2007

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information
United States Bomb Data Center

Dear Sir:

Wizard Devices, in business since 1992, is a Small Combat Veteran Owned Business. We manufacture Blasting Machines and DSL circuit testing devices which are sold worldwide.

This is a reply to the 12/13/2007 memo generated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information, United States Bomb Data Center, USBDC 08-03. The findings of their independent scientific testing facility, Franklin Applied Physics (FAP), are incorrect and physically impossible. FAP's recommendation, "NO ONE SHOULD USE A WIZARD DSL IN ANY CIRCUIT THAT CONTAINS AN ELECTRO-EXPLOSIVE DEVICE", is incorrect and invalid.

I would like to inform all interested parties that the FAPs reporting and ATF's action are totally erroneous based upon the following facts:

1. FAP's newsletter, Volume 40~Number 11, dated November 2007, reported that one Wizard DSL multimeter reading was as high as 420 milliamperes. This is physically and electronically impossible because the battery utilized in the DSL is a CR2032 coin battery. Manufacturers of the CR2032 batteries rate their batteries at only 180 milliamperes. That's a difference of 240 milliamperes, more than 200% of the batteries' possible capacity. Where did all the extra voltage come from?
2. FAP stated that, "two devices had reversed polarity." This, too, is electronically impossible. A LED is a Light Emitting Diode which only allows current to flow in one direction; if the current is reversed the circuit will not function. Hence, no reversed polarity. Hewlett Packard (HP) performed extensive testing on their LED (Part# HLMP-1700) before marketing. HP tested over one million LED's, which were the same type used in the DSL, and there were NO failures.
3. FAP stated, "The copper contacts have no mechanical support." There is an eighth inch rim around the copper contact which is supported by the plastic body. The plastic composition used in the DSL has a tensile strength of 3,000 pounds per square inch. One of our DSL's was reported to have been run over by a bulldozer. The operator picked it up, tested the DSL, and it worked fine.
4. FAP stated, "we pressed our wires forcefully against the contacts, the current shot up to

over 400 milliamperes.” This is physically and electronically impossible for reasons previously stated.

5. FAP stated further that the copper contacts may move slightly inward and may contact the battery holder. The battery holder is wrapped in insulation during manufacturing. “IF” the contacts could move by overcoming the 3,000 psi plastic shell, it would also have to pass through the insulation to make contact with the battery holder.
6. FAP stated, “We immersed one device in commercial paint-remover overnight to dissolve the yellow plastic body.” After removing the parts from the plastic, the identification would have been easy to see, it is etched in the metal battery case. The resistor can be identified by the color code. All of the parts can be found in a Digi-Key or Mouser parts catalog, which would also provide specifications for each part.
7. FAP stated, “measuring resistance we generally use a current less than 10 milliamperes.” FAP is not a regulating authority to set any standard. The standards for explosive testers limiting current has been established by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) and the Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME). The allowable upper limit testing current is 50 milliamperes, 40 milliamperes higher than that stated by FAP.
8. FAP stated that the M6 electric blasting cap has a no-fire current level of 0.20 amperes. The U.S. Army Field Support Command’s specification is “200 to 210 milliamperes for duration of 5 seconds.” The Wizard DSL battery as stated supplies only 180 milliamperes.
9. The ATF USBDC 08-03 stated, “ETB acquired nine Wizard DSL’s, including the one in use during the January incident. All of these were submitted for examination and testing.” The ATF memo fails to describe the testing results that were reported for the “incident DSL”. The memo allows the reader to assume the DSL was at fault for the incident. Was there a chain of custody maintained on the “incident DSL” to ensure accurate reporting?
10. Had these “incident DSL’s” been in use prior to the alleged event? If this was not the first time the DSL was used, how could the DSL generate enough amperage to initiate an M-6 Blasting Cap? Every Wizard Devices product is tested both for voltage and milliamperes outputs prior shipping to ensure the units are in compliance with manufactures and MSHA specifications.
11. Upon being made aware of any incident I would try to gain as much information as possible. After the Kuwait incident, I talked to the ARMY EOD team Sergeant, and he stated the DSL was tested just prior to the incident, and it was tested after the incident to evaluate the accident. The DSL had not changed from MSHA specifications. The DSL cannot change; it is a simple circuit, in a solid mass.
12. After another incident in Texas the DSL was tested and found to be within specifications.
13. After the January incident, I called the Bomb Squad Sergeant to gain information and

request testing information on the DSL. He was less than helpful. I requested that he send the DSL to the FBI for testing and to please provide updates. I never heard from that Bomb Squad again.

14. In fact, I have never been directly contacted by anyone involved in the alleged DSL incidents, not the EOD Tech Center, ATF, FBI, or any Bomb Squad Commander. Franklin Applied Physics also failed to communicate or verify any of its data. I heard events through the grape vine, and then I had to seek information on my own.
15. ATF USBDC 08-03 stated, "Out of an abundance of caution, ATF has also recalled Wizard Blasting Machines from the field." If this decision is based on the test light LED in the WIZ50G2 Blasting Machine, the circuit and battery are different. The battery used in the WIZ50G2 is a CR1616, which produces only 55 milliamperes of energy. The final output from the LED test light current is within MSHA and IME specifications.
16. ATF's decision to recall the Wizard Blasting Machines prior to any testing is without merit. What regulating enforcement criterion is "out of the abundance of caution"? This over zealous action by ATF represents an unfair and total boycott of Wizard Devices products.
17. The DSL has been tested, approved, and certified by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). The DSL approval number is MSHA No. #18-A0500002-2. Why should ATF pay an independent testing facility, when private funds have already been expended to a certifying Government Agency to perform the testing and approval? How can ATF disapprove of something that is already approved by another U.S. Government Agency?
18. Fact: No evidence can prove that any Wizard Devices product was the direct cause of any catastrophic event.

In conclusion, I request that an immediate retraction of ATF USBDC 08-03 is in order, and ATF personnel should approve Wizard Devices products for purchase and use.

Thank you for your prompt attention in correcting and disseminating information on this matter. If there are any questions, please contact me by phone, 301-309-6825, or by email at wizarddevices@comcast.net.

Sincerely,

Harold Lapping
President, Wizard Devices, Inc.